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BIAS OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS
By

KENNETH CULP DAVIS*

1. "An amorphous dunny unspotted by human emotions [is
not] a becoming receptacle for judicial power."
2. "The people of this country will not permit the courts to declare a policy for them with respect to this subject."
3. "The judge or administrator applying indefinite statutory
provisions ought to be something other than impartial referee and
arbitrator."
4. "Bias from strong and sincere conviction as to public policy
may operate as a more serious disqualification than pecuniary
interest."
The contrariety of views advanced in these quotations poses a
central question: What sort of biases should be deemed incompatible with the exercise of judicial power? The first quotation,
surprisingly enough, is from Mr. Justice McReynolds, who is
saying not only that a judge who had strong anti-German feelings
after the First World War was qualified to try Germans for
espionage, but that a judge who lacked such emotions was not
qualified: "A public officer who entertained no aversion towards
disloyal German immigrants during the late war was simply unfit
for his place."' The second quotation is from a unanimous report
in 1914 of a Senate Committee concerning interpretation and enforcement of the antitrust laws.2 The Committee carefully reviewed Supreme Court decisions, observed that "the court does not
administer the law, but makes the law," and recommended estab*Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. Berger v. United States, (1921) 225 U. S. 22, 43.
2. Sen. Rep. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1914), reprinted in 51
Cong. Rec. 11384.
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lishment of a commission for administration of the antitrust laws.
The third quotation is representative of many similar statements
by commentators who believe that the right point of view or bias
is indispensable to proper performance of judicial tasks.3 And
the fourth expresses the much-criticized view of the British Com4
mittee on Ministers' Powers, the Sankey Committee.
This paper is not so ambitious as to try to resolve the philosophical issue. Instead, the purpose is merely to summarize the
prevailing law concerning bias of administrative officers who perform judicial functions, and to discuss some of the main reasons
lying behind that law.
The Meaning of "'Bias"

The term "bias" both in dictionaries and in legal usage has a
multiplicity of meanings. It is often a synonym for prejudice.
signifying fixed and unalterable conclusions not founded on
reason or understanding, or a tendency to form final judgments in ignorance of essential facts, or an unwillingness to
consider new evidence or new argument. Prejudices, inevitable
though they may be in all human beings, are a mark of weakness.
Another common meaning of "bias" is a tendency of thought in
one direction on a controversial question. In this sense, most
Americans have a bias for democratic methods, the pre-1937 Supreme Court was thought by many to have had a bias in favor of
property interests, and the present Court seems to have a bias in
favor of judicial self-restraint permitting government regulation
of economic life. A judge may have a bias on a question of law
because he decided the question in a previous judicial opinion.
Everyone who thinks has biases in this sense; the judge who has
the most biases in this sense may even be the best judge. A third
kind of bias, often denominated "partiality," signifies an attitude
for or against a party as distinguished from tendencies of thought
concerning issues of law or policy, and is commonly regarded as a
basis for disqualification. A fourth kind of bias is better called
"interest." A judge who stands to gain or lose by a decision either
way-because he owns stock in a corporation or is related to a
party or is substantially affected as a taxpayer-has an interest
of the kind that is generally considered a ground for disqualification.
3. Hyneman, Administrative Adjudication, (1936) 51 Pol. Sci. Q. 383,
516, 526.
4. Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers 78 (1932).
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Is a Crystallized Point of View A Basis
for Disqualification?
This question probably would not deserve discussion were it not
for the unusual view of the British Committee on Ministers' Powers
that bias from strong and sincere conviction as to public policy should
disqualify. The Committee explained: "The judge ought to be
free to decide on purely judicial grounds and should not be directly
or indirectly influenced by, or exposed to the influences of, either
motives of self-interest or opinions about policy or any other considerations not relevant to the issue."- This statement seems to be
an anachronism springing from a nineteenth-century belief that
law is found and not made, a belief that has now virtually disappeared. Today we have grown weary of the overquoted statement
from Holmes that "the life of the law has not been logic but experience." Today we are often affirmatively anxious that our case
law should reflect the policy views of the judges.6 Years ago Mr.
justice Holmes declared: "I think that the judges themselves have
failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations
of social advantage."7 Mr. justice Cardozo decries the pretense
that "judges must lose respect and confidence by the reminder
that they are subject to human limitations," and he points out that
"the great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not
turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by."8 Yet the Committee on Ministers' Powers assumes that there is opposition between "purely judicial grounds" and "opinions about policy."
And (through the word "other") the Committee even asserts that
opinions about policy are not relevant to issues to be decided by
judges.
Professor Jaffe has effectively answered the Committee's statement: "If emotionally determined values constituted a disqualification, judges would be under constant attack and judicial-constituti, nal law non-existent. Nor is this entirely a matter of necessary
evil. Certain persons give thanks for the predispositions of Mr.
justice Butler and certain others looked upon Mr. Justice Holmes'
5. Ibid.
6. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 311 (1941): "The
ultimate function of the Supreme Court is nothing less than the arbitration
between fundamental and ever-present rival forces or trends in our organized society."
7. Holmes, The Path of the Law, (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 466.
8. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (1921).
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prejudices in favor of free speech as the mOst precious of safeguards." 9
The decisions, of course, reject the view of the Committee on
,Ministers' Powers. Outstanding is the Fourth Morgan case."
After the Second Morgan case, the Secretary of Agriculture vigorously criticized the Court's decision in a letter to the New York
Times. The market agencies charged that this letter disqualified
the Secretary from reconsideration of the case after it was remanded to him. This contention was rather summarily rejected
by the Supreme Court: "But, intrinsically, the letter did not require
the Secretary's dignified denial of bias. That he not merely held,
but expressed, strong views on matters believed by him to have
been in issue, did not unfit him for exercising his duty in subsequent proceedings ordered by the Court."11 The Court further
observed that both cabinet officers and judges "may have an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case."' 12 Many other
cases support the proposition that strong conviction on questions
of law or policy does not disqualify." After all, a holding the other
way would mean that a judge would be barred from deciding a case
on the authority of his own previous decision.
M

9. Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, (1939) 52
Harv. L. Rev. 1201, 1219.
10. Morgan v. United States, (1941) 313 U. S. 409.
11. 313 U. S. at 421.
12. Ibid.
13. In Crowley-Milner & Co. v. Reid, (1927) 239 Mich. 605, 215 N. W.
29, the court quoted with approval from Tuttle v. Tuttle, (1921) 48 N. D.
10, 27, 181 N. W. 898, 906: "The mere fact that a judge entertains, or even
has expressed, an opinion upon some question of law, does not disqualify
him on the ground of bias or prejudice."
Hudspeth v. State, (1933) 188 Ark. 323, 327, 67 S. W. 2d 191, 193:
"'The words bias and prejudice, as used in the law of the subject under
consideration, refer to the mental attitude or disposition of the judge towards a party to the litigation, and not to any views that he may entertain
regarding the subject matter involved'" Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Com., (1939) 232 Wis. 274, 312, 287 N. W. 122, 141-42: "Bias and prejudice
attributable to some feeling against the company is an entirely different
thing than zeal in the discharge of a highly important public duty." See also
Pennsylvania Publications v. Pennsylvania P. U. C., (1943) 152 Pa. Super.
279, 298, 32 A. 2d 40, 49; Oregon Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLRB, (D. Ore.
1943) 49 F. Supp. 386, 388.
Some judicial statements of this general principle may go too far. In
Elder v. Camp, (1942) 193 Ga. 320, 18 S. E. 2d 622, the court declared in the
syllabus: "Alleged prejudice or bias of a judge, which is not based on an
interest either pecuniary or relationship to a party within a prohibited degree,
affords no legal ground for disqualification." If the judge shows personal
animosity toward one of the parties, he should be disqualified.
See Frank, Disqualification of Judges, (1947) 56 Yale L. J. 605; Sedgwick, Disqualification on the Ground of Bias as Applied to Administrative
Tribunals, (1945) 23 Can. B. Rev. 453; Note (1941) 51 Yale L. J. 169, on
disqualification of judges; Note (1941) 41 Col. L. R. 1384, on disqualification
of administrative officials.
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In some circumstances, one in the position of the judge may
even have taken a position not only on law and policy but also on
facts, without becoming disqualified. Perhaps the best treatment
of this question is that of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Donnelly
Garment Co.14 The examiner conducted a hearing, made many
rulings adverse to the company, and filed a report finding unfair
labor practices. The Board upheld the rulings, adopted the recommendations, and issued an order. A circuit court of appeals set
aside the order on the ground that improper exclusion of evidence
rendered the hearing unfair. The Board set the case for supplemental hearing before the same examiner. The company insisted
the examiner had prejudged as valueless the evidence to be presented at the new hearing, and moved for a new examiner. 15 The
Board denied the application, the examiner ruled the same way,
and the Board issued virtually the same order as before. The circuit
court of appeals denied the Board's petition for enforcement,
partly on the ground that the motion for a new examiner should
have been granted." The Supreme Court unanimously held that
under the rule of judicial administration (apart from statute) a
judge is not disqualified from sitting in a retrial because he was
reversed on earlier rulings, and that there is "no warrant for imposing upon administrative agencies a stiffer rule, whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit because they ruled strongly against
17

a party in the first hearing.1

The federal statute on disqualification of judges provides:
"Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal,
shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the
action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has any personal bias
14.

(1947) 330 U. S. 219. Cf. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. F. T. C.,

(C.C.A. 7th 1945) 147 F. 2d 589, (1945) 33 Geo. L. J. 311, holding Commission not disqualified by reason of previous belief in harmful economic
effects of cement industry's multiple basing point price system.

15. The examiner made various statements, such as "No, I don't think
it is of any value in the issues in this case, to parade these people on the
stand." "I think I should tell you now that if there is any further testimony
of that kind, you can put it in an offer of proof, because I don't think it is
material to the issues here." See Donnelly Garment Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A.
8th 1945) 151 F. 2d 854, 870.
16. The court said: "With all due respect to the Trial Examiner, who
conducted himself with courtesy and patience under conditions which were
not always tranquil, it is hard to believe that he could be entirely impartial
in weighing evidence which he, sincerely, considered to be of no value or
materiality." Ibid.
17. 330 U. S. at 236-37. Accord: In re 3. P. Linahan, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d
1943) 138 F. 2d 650 (special master) ; Kolowich v. Wayne County, (1933)
264 Mich. 668, 250 N. W. 875 (judge). Contra: State v. Atterberry, (1926)
134 S.C. 392, 133 S.E. 101 (judge).
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or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party
to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another
judge shall be designated. .

. ."

The bias here concerns personal

attitude toward parties, not views as to law and policy. Under this
statute, it is held that an affidavit charging bias is properly ignored
when it alleges "an impersonal prejudice," since the statute requires
that the bias or prejudice be "personal." 19
Ordinarily personal animosity, which disqualifies, is easy to
distinguish from views on law and policy, which do not disqualify.
A case in which this differentiation was difficult is Berger v.
United States, from which the statement above quoted from Mr.
Justice McReynolds is taken.20 The trial judge in a prosecution
for espionage after the First World War refused to disqualify
himself even though an affidavit was filed by the defendants, who
were Germans, alleging that the judge was "prejudiced and biased
against said defendants because of their nativity." The judge had
previously stated that "one must have a very judicial mind, indeed,
not to be prejudiced against the German Americans in this country. .

.

. I know a safeblower . . . and as between him and this

defendant, I prefer the safeblower." The Supreme Court held, six
to three, that the judge was disqualified. The majority believed
that the judge's statements evinced a personal prejudice against a
class of which the defendants were members, 21 thereby showing a
prejudice against the defendants. The minority reasoned that personal bias was lacking, since it did not appear that the judge "had
any acquaintance with any of the defendants." 22
Is a Crystallized Point of View Sometimes Positively Desirable?
This question is apposite for both judges and administrators who
perform judicial functions. Even a superficial glance at American
history will reveal that Presidents from Washington to Truman
have taken into account basic philosophies on the central problems
of the day in making judicial appointments. Theodore Roosevelt
18. 36 Stat. 1090 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 25 (1940), Judicial Code § 21.
19. Price v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th 1942) 125 F. 2d 806, certiorari denied,
(1942) 316 U. S. 677. Cf. Scott v. Beams, (C.C.A. 10th 1941) 122 F. 2d
777, 788.
20. (1921) 255 U. S. 22.
21. This is the interpretation given in Ryan v. United States, (C.C.A.
8th 1938) 99 F. 2d 864, 871, cert. den. (1939) 306 U. S. 635, rehearing den.
(1939) 306 U. S. 668.
22. 255 U. S. at 41. Mr. Justice McReynolds asked: "If an admitted
anarchist charged with murder should affirm an existing prejudice against
himself and specify that the judge had made certain depreciatory remarks
concerning all anarchists, what would be the result?"
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was outspoken on this subject. In a passage quoted with approval
by Mr. Justice Cardozo, he said: "The decisions of the courts on
economic and social questions depend upon their economic and
social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who
hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and
not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product
of primitive economic conditions."2 3 And Cardozo commented:
"Roosevelt, who knew men, had no illusions on this score."24
One of the prime purposes behind the creation of many administrative agencies has been to escape the bias of judges. By and
large, with many exceptions, judges who have been influenced by
legal training toward conservative thought and who have been
accustomed as advocates at the bar to favoring interests of property
tend to be biased in favor of protection of private rights against
governmental interference. This is what Judge Learned Hand
meant when he said in 1916: "The profession is still drawn, and
so far as we can see will always be drawn, from the propertied
class, but other classes have awakened to conscious control of
their fate. .

.

. But the profession has not yet learned to adapt

itself to the change; that most difficult of adjustments has not
been made, an understanding of and sympathy with the purposes
and ideals of those parts of the common society whose interests
are discordant with its own."25 This was the idea the Senate Committee was advancing in 1914 when it said that the people will
not permit the courts to declare the basic antitrust policies, and
that therefore a commission should be created to declare those
policies.2 Landis has pointed out the reasons which motivated
Congress in creating the Federal Trade Commission instead of
giving its powers of adjudication to the courts: "In the field of
industrial regulation deep and enduring disappointments had already resulted from the judicial attitude toward railroad legislation and toward the Sherman Act .... [The courts] too frequently
set at naught the public and political effort which had so hopefully
expended itself in the passage of the statute. ' 27 Other writers have
23. Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 1908, 43 Cong. Rec. 21.

24. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 173 (1921).
25. Learned Hand, The Speech of Justice, (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev.
617, 619.
26. Sen. Rep. No. 1326, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1914), reprinted in 51

Cong. Rec. 11384.

27. Landis, The Administrative Process 96 (1938). Landis accordingly
argues that trial examiners should have a "proper bias" toward the ad-

ministrative point of view. Id. at 104. "To lodge a great, interpretative power
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noted that "the creation of the more controversial of these agencies
was brought about by an explicit fear of the bias of the judiciary," 28
and that the power of interpretation must be vested in "persons
who are not by their environment and their specialized training,
or by the dictates of their technique, imbued with the idea that
'29
social legislation is pernicious.
Some years ago an American Bar Association committee, by
way of condemnation of the administrative process, asserted: "Administration, with its ideal and function of getting things done.
has, and from its ideal will have, a tendency to act from one side.
An administrative agency is not unlikely to have been set up to
get things done in the interest of one side which controls or has
the favor of the executive for the time being." 30 This statement, if
slightly modified to substitute the legislative for the executive.
would be entirely accurate, as applied to many agencies. But is it a
mark of weakness that an agency may have an assignment of
carrying out policies declared through a democratic process? The
view of the Bar Association's committee seems to be that law must
be declared solely by judges whose decisions should be carefully
kept unresponsive to democratic desires. Why should the people
be denied the power to declare through their elected representatives the point of view which should control the interpretation and
application of measures which are deliberately designed to change
judge-made law ?31
in the judiciary involved the risk that a policy, which initially was given to
the administrative to formulate, might be thwarted at its most significant
fulcrum by judgments antagonistic to its own." Id. at 97. Vanderbilt says the
Landis view "runs counter to our experience over the centuries." See Vander-

bilt, The Place of the Administrative Tribunal in Our Legal System, (1938)
24 A. B. A. J. 267, 272.
28. Feller, Administrative Lav Investigation Comes of Age, (1941)

41 Col. L. Rev. 589.
29. Jennings, Courts and Administrative Law-The Experience of English Housing Legislation, (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 426, 454. See also McGoldrick, Graubard, and Horowitz, Finality of Administrative Determination

in New York City Building Regulation, (1942) 19 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 109.
157-58: "Is not the interpretation of statutes a process undertaken not in
the shadows of the reports and dictionaries but in the stress of competing
social policy considerations? The meaning of a statutory phrase is not

plucked from some mystical juristic heaven but is predominantly influenced.
even dictated, by the end result that the judicial or the administrative
lexicographer wishes to reach."

30. Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, (1938)
63 A. B. A. Rep. 331, 342.
31. An 1834 report to the French Chamber of Deputies contrasts courts'
tendencies with administrative tendencies, the one emphasizing legal theories
at the expense of the needs of practical administration and the other doing
the opposite. The interesting fact is that the Council of State was deliberately
set up so as to mix the biases-so as to secure a middle view. This wa.s
done by providing that a portion of the members of the Council should be
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When Congress enacts a comprehensive statute enunciating new
policies and creating a new agency, the commissioners might be
chosen from those who agree with the new policies, from those
who oppose it, or from those who are indifferent. Since the commissioners are to perform a judicial function, a superficial consideration might readily lead to a choice of the indifferent, who are
relatively free from bias and may therefore be more likely to hold
the scales of justice in even balance.3 2 But the task of the administrators is not merely to find simple adjudicative facts from
disputed evidence; that task includes the assembling and interpretation of social and economic facts and the positive creation of
a body of subsidiary law and policy designed to promote congressional objectives. If the people through their representatives are
to have power not merely to change what is written on the statute
books but to have those changes made effective through actual
administration, then the ideal commissioners will be men whose
sincere ideas of policy conform to the broad legislative intent. A
Price Administrator ought not to be indifferent to the forces of
inflation, a Trade Commissioner should not be neutral on antimonopoly policies, and a Securities and Exchange Commissioner
should not be apathetic about the need for governmental restrictions. Administrators who are unsympathetic toward the legislative
program are very likely to thwart the democratic will ;83the way
to translate legislative policies into action is to secure administrators
whose honest opinions-biases-are favorable to those policies.
"It is a sine qua non of good administration that it believe in the
rightness and worth of the laws it is enforcing and that it be prepared to bring to the task zeal and astuteness in finding out and
making effective those purposes.

' ' 34

drawn from practical administration. See Rohkam and Pratt, Studies in
French Administrative Law 19 (1947). A wise legislative body might conceivably choose one bias for one function, another for another function, and
mixed biases for a third function, depending on substantive needs for the
various functions.
32. Of course, this is not to suggest that the indifferent would be free
from bias. On the contrary, as Judge Frank has said, "If . . . 'bias' and
'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the
mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever
will. The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are
born with predispositions; and the process of education, formal and informal, creates attitudes in all men which affect them in judging situations,
attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances, and which, therefore, by definition, are prejudices." See In re J. P. Linahan, Inc., (C.C.A.
2d 1943) 138 F. 2d 650, 651.
33. The history of section 20 of the Clayton Act proves this. See Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction Ch. IV (1930).
34. Jaffe, The Reform of Administrative Procedure, (1942) 2 Pub. Ad.
Rev. 141, 149.
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This is far from saying that law should be administered by
zealots or crusaders who lack perspective or stability. Judgment
must of course be guided by intellectual perception, not by emotion;
performance of judicial tasks necessarily calls for integrity, character, and ability. The administrator's belief in the cause he is furthering, even though that cause has won legislative approval, must not
overpower the recognition of competing interests. Sincere conviction should not be so steadfast as to shut out inquiry and reexamination. Belief must not be so unyielding as to smother the
contributions that alert practical administration may make to the
molding and remolding of policy. And yet a dominant point of
view or bias may appropriately color all activities, including even
the fact-finding function.3" Thoroughly conscientious men of strong
conviction may sometimes interpret evidence to make findings which
indifferent men would not make. The theoretically ideal administrator is one whose broad point of view is in general agreement
with the policies he administers but who maintains sufficient balance to perceive and to avoid the degree of zeal which substantially
impairs fair-mindedness. 8
Partiality as- Sown by Conduct of Trial
A judge or other presiding officer at a trial may show partiality
toward one side and hostility toward the other side which goes so
far as to make a fair hearing impossible. The Supreme Court has
held that "the bias or prejudice which can be urged against a judge
must be based upon something other than rulings in the case '' J
and that "it must be based upon facts antedating the trial, not those
occurring during the trial."38 This view has been followed recently
by the lower courts. 30 But it is hardly surprising that the lower
courts have frequently departed from this view, for partiality or
35. This is quite consistent with Professor Jaffe's observation: "Our
tradition rightly interpreted is that the judge should be neutral toward the
question of whether the specific defendant is guilty. It is a perversion of
that tradition to demand that the judge be neutral toward the purposes of
the law." Ibid.
36. See Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Locke, (C.C.A. 2d 1932) 60 F. 2d
35, 38, holding that a deputy commissioner's premature expression of an
opinion on the merits did not disqualify because he "did not indicate that his
mind was not open to any proof."
37. The Court made this statement in Berger v. United States, (1921)
255 U. S. 22, 31, relying on Ex parte American Steel Barrel Co., (1913)
230 U. S. 35.
38. 255 U. S. at 34.
39. Ryan v. United States, (C.C.A. 8th 1938) 99 F. 2d 864, cert. den.
(1939) 306 U. S. 635, rehearing den. (1939) 306 U. S. 668; Walker v.
United States, (C.C.A. 9th 1940) 116 F. 2d 458.
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hostility when it goes far enough may obviously vitiate the
fairness
40
of a hearing, even in absence of specific reversible error.
The Circuit Courts of Appeals have passed upon hosts of contentions that trial examiners of the National Labor Relations
Board have been guilty of this kind of bias. 4 In many cases the
courts have found the charges of bias unfounded: "The heat of the
contest has, we think, led respondent to attribute bias because of
the intensity of its own feeling. 4 2- "This record discloses . . .
exemplary fairness. . .".
1,"We are left with a strong impression
that much of the conduct complained of was deliberately provoked
by counsel for the company ....)Y44 "The offender against due and

orderly trial procedure was in reality respondent's trial attorney,
whose apparent desire from the outset of the hearing was to goad
the examiner into unjudicial words or conduct. '4 5 These cases
and others4 of the same kind prove that charges against the Labor
Board's examiners have often been quite unjust to the Board and
its examiners.
In another group of Labor Board cases the courts have refused
to reverse for undue bias, even though absence of bias was not
clearly shown. One court found "sarcasm not appropriate to a
4' 7
judicial officer," but that "the conduct of the hearings was fair.
Another found the conduct of the hearing "justly subject to criticism," but not "so unfair as to constitute a denial of due process. '48
40. This statement is adequately supported by the cases discussed in this
section, including especially Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 7th 1940) 109
F. 2d 9, and NLRB v. Phelps, (C.C.A. 5th 1943) 136 F. 2d 562. The contrary
view was expressed in NLRB v. Air Associates, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d 1941) 121
F. 2d 586, 589, but this expression accompanies a finding of lack of bias,
and even this court would probably reverse upon finding such conduct of the
examiner as that shown in NLRB v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th 1941) 118 F. 2d 980. In Ott v. Board of Registration, (1931)
276 lass. 566, 177 N. E. 542 an administrative order was set aside because
of "an attitude ... which was not fair and impartial," especially with respect
to limiting cross-examination.
41. Some of the cases are discussed in Note (1941) 30 Geo. L. J. 54.
42. NLRB v. Acme-Evans Co:, (C.C.A. 7th 1942) 130 F. 2d 477, 482.
43. Continental Box Co., Inc. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 5th 1940) 113 F. 2d
93, 96.
44. NLRB v. Weirton Steel Co., (C.C.A. 3d 1943) 135 F. 2d 494, 497.
45. NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, (C.C.A. 3d 1942) 128 F. 2d
39, 45. A wealth of materials on this subject may be found in the opinion in
which Judge Clark dissented on other grounds.
46. NLRB v. Gallup American Coal Co., (C.C.A. 10th 1942) 131 F. 2d
554; NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d 1938) 94 F. 2d 862;
NLRB v. Thompson Products, Inc., (C.C.A. 9th 1944) 141 F. 2d 794; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NLRB, (App. D.C. 1941) 120 F. 2d 641; NLRB v.
Condenser Corp., (C.C.A. 3d 1942) 128 F. 2d 67, 79.
47. NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., (C.C.A. 3d 1939) 105 F. 2d 167.
48. Cupples Co. MIfrs. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 8th 1939) 106 F. 2d 100.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:199

In another case the court thought the conduct of the examiner
"left much to be desired," and stated that "had this been a close
case his conduct might have been sufficient cause for a denial of
this petition. ''1 9 In two cases50 it was held that even if prejudice
or partiality had been shown, still the courts would deny relief.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held: "Even if bias
against respondent was manifested in the examiner's intermediate
report and recommendations, that bias became irmnaterial, since
the Board ignored that report and relied solely and directly on the
evidence in the record ....
Even assuming, however, that it were
proved, either by the record or otherwise, that the examiner was
biased against respondent, -we would find no reason, merely because of the fact, for upsetting the Board's order, since respondent
does not assert that the examiner committed any error in the admission or exclusion of evidence, nor is there any indication that
he conducted himself in a manner which either was likely to intimidate any of the witnesses or to prevent any of them from giving
any relevant testimony as to what they believed to be the facts ....
1
This view is in direct conflict with that expressed in the Seventh
Circuit 2 and in one case in the Fifth Circuit,53 although in another
case in the Fifth Circuit, the court declared: "If the Board was in
any way prejudiced, the Act provides no remedy before us .... "4
In four cases15 orders of the Labor Board have been held unenforceable because of undue bias of examiners. What is probably
the highest standard is enunciated in, the Fifth Circuit: "The
rigidity of the requirement that the trier be impartial and unconcerned in the result applies more strictly to an administrative adjudication where many of the safeguards which have been thrown
around court proceedings have . . . been relaxed. . . . When the
fault of bias and prejudice in a judge first rears its ugly head, its
effect remains throughout the whole proceeding ....
It taints and
49. NLRB v. Western Cartridge Co., (C.C.A. 2d 1943) 138 F. 2d 551,

cert. den. (1944) 321 U. S. 786.

50. NLRB v. Air Associates, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d 1941) 121 F. 2d 586;
NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., (C.C.A. 5th 1941) 122 F. 2d 433.
51. NLRB v. Air Associates, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d 1941) 121 F. 2d 586,
588-89.
52. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 7th 1940) 109 F. 2d 9.
53. NLRB v. Phelps, (C.C.A. 5th 1943) 136 F. 2d 562.
54. NLRB v. Tex-O-Kan Flour Mills Co., (C.C.A. 5th 1941) 122

F. 2d 433.
55. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 8th 1939) 103 F. 2d
147; Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 7th 1940) 109 F. 2d 9; NLRB v.
Washington Dehydrated Food Co., (C.C.A. 9th 1941) 118 F. 2d 980; NLRB
v. Phelps, (C.C.A. 5th 1943) 136 F. 2d 562.
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vitiates all of the proceedings... ."' In one of the four cases finding undue bias, the examiner's conduct probably would have
been held improper by any court; he "was guilty of threatening,
badgering, and arguing with the witnesses, making statements
during the hearing contradictory of the true facts, cutting short
cross-examination, and acting more in the role of a prosecutor than
7
impartial examiner."
Interest

Most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest
applies with equal force to judges and to administrative adjudicators. Professor Frank has recently provided a comprehensive
survey of practices with respect to disqualification of judges;
he shows, for instance, that a judge is not disqualified merely because an advocate is the judge's former partner."8
One who stands to gain or lose personally by a decision either
way is disqualified to participate in the exercise of judicial functions. The key decision is Tumey v. Ohio.5 9 Those accused of violating the prohibition laws were tried before a Mayor who was
allowed to retain, as his own compensation, costs assessed against
defendants who were convicted, but received no such compensation from defendants who were not convicted. This system was
held unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law: "Every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter
due process of law.' ' "° One might expect such an obvious proposition as this to find universal acceptance; yet it is said that the
majority view is that in non-criminal cases it is due process to
make an official's compensation depend on the decision he makes. 61
In Indiana fees of justices of the peace are paid only when de56. NLRB v. Phelps, (C.C.A. 5th 1943) 136 F. 2d 562, 563-64. The

examiner whose attitude the court found to be "not impartial but partial,
not disinterested but partisan," is now the Board's General Counsel.
57. NLRB v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., (C.C.A. 9th 1941) 118
F. 2d 980, 996. The autocratic attitude of the examiner in this case is shown
by his announcement: "I would like to advise counsel that the Trial Examiner
is exceedingly loathe to permit further examination after he has examined
the witness...."
58. See Frank, Disqualification of Judges, (1947) 56 Yale L. J.605.
59. (1927) 273 U. S. 510.
60. 273 U. S. at 532.
61. Note, The Disqualification of Administrative Officials, (1941) 41
Col. L. Rev. 1384, 1396.
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fendants are found guilty but the validity of the system is upheld.0 2
A Tennessee system of compensating assessors in accordance with
the value of the property assessed by them has been upheld in two
4
cases.63 Most surprising is De Pauw University v. Brunk, upholding a system permitting a probate judge to determine whether
an estate is taxable, to fix the amount of the tax and to receive
two and one-half per cent of the tax for his compensation. The
probate court, it was declared, "is an administrative tribunal ...
While it is essential to due process of law in the usual judicial proceeding that the judge shall be disinterested and impartial, it is
not essential to due process of law that an administrative officer
shall be disinterested and impartial." 65 Despite this language, however, the best explanation of the case probably is that the kind of
judicial review provided was likely to prevent injustice.66 In addition, as in the Tennessee cases, the immediate result of invalidating
the system would have been to permit the taxpayer before the
court to escape what may have been an entirely fair tax. Much
more likely to command support is the view of the Illinois court,
which invalidated a system of paying an assessment commissioner
two per cent of the amount collected, simply because: "The larger
the assessment, the more compensation he would receive."' 6?
Many cases relating to the assessment or improvement or condemnation of property have dealt with the effect of the incidental
ownership of some such property by the officials. Thus, in Lent v.
Tillson,"5 the Supreme Court held that no federal question was
raised by a municipal arrangement providing that the mayor, who
owned property on the street, should serve as one of three members of a board to determine damages incurred by owners on
account of the -widening of the street, any aggrieved party being
permitted to secure de novo judicial review. Some cases have been
more strict in treating comparable questions. 69
62. State v. Schelton, (1933) 205 Ind. 416, 186 N. E. 772; Harding v.
Mimas, (1934) 206 Ind. 661, 190 N. E. 862.
63. State v. Tenn. Coal, I. & R. Co., (1895) 94 Tenn. 295, 29 S. W.
116; Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. McFall, (1912) 128 Tenn. 645, 163 S. W.
806. In the first case the court relied in part on waiver resulting from lack
of timely objection, and the second case was decided largely on authority of
the first, although in the second case lack of timely objection was not mentioned.
64. (W.D. Mo. 1931) 53 F. 2d 647, aff'd on other grounds, (1932)

285 U. S. 527.
65. Id. at 651.
66. The court leaned heavily on this idea.

67. Chase v. City of Evanston, (1898) 172 Ill. 403, 50 N. E. 241.

68.

(1891) 140 U. S. 316.

69. E.g., Stahl v. Board of Ringgold Co., (1920)

187 Iowa 1342, 175
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Another manifestation of pecuniary interest is that of the commissioner who is appointed for the purpose of representing the
economic group of which he is a member. Here the notion is that
the interest or bias is affirmatively desirable. Thus, the Railroad
Retirement Board is made up of three members, one of whom, according to the statute, is to be recommended by the carriers, one
to be recommended by the employees, and the third, the public
representative, "shall not be in the employment of or be pecuniarily
or otherwise interested in any employer or any organization of
employees. ' 7" It has been suggested that "the tripartisan composition of the Board enables it to secure a higher degree of cooperation and confidence from the interested parties than could a board
whose entire membership was drawn from outside the railroad
industry. '71 The National Railroad Adjustment Board is composed of eighteen representatives of carriers and eighteen representatives of railway labor unions, all thirty-six being in the employ of their principals and not government employees. The members of the Board are expected to be partisan. The same theory
underlay the organization of such tribunals as the National Defense
Mediation Board, the War Labor Board, and the Wage Stabilization Board.
Whether or not these bipartisan or tripartite tribunals are desirable for the performance of adjudicatory functions is a question which may not be answerable in definitive terms on the basis
of experience. On an ideal plane, the advantages of adjudication
by theoretically disinterested judges are readily apparent.72 The
partisan system is regarded by many as appallingly inefficient in
some respects. But when parties on both sides insist on having their
representatives within the organization, it is hardly surprising that
Congress sets up the agency accordingly. Of the National Railroad
Adjustment Board, the Attorney General's Committee said that
its bipartisan character "is a reflection of historical developments
and that, with all of its imperfections, it may make for a more
workable adjudicatory mechanism than could a plan constructed
N.. W. 772; Appeal of McClure, (1890) 137 Pa. 590, 20 AtI. 711. Many cases
of this kind are collected and discussed in Note (1941) 41 Col. L. Rev. 1384.
70. 50 Stat. 314 (1937), 45 U. S. C. § 228j (1940).
71. Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 186, Part 8, p. 7 (1940).
72. Reijort, Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 186 (1941) concerning the National Railroad Adjustment Board: "The
opinion may . . . be expressed that a nonpartisan agency, if it could be
brought into being by agreement among the various interests affected, would
prove to be an instrumentality superior to the one now maintained ...

Gellhorn, Federal Administrative Proceedings 131-44 (1941).

"

Cf.
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. The Committee is not prepared to recommend

that the Board be replaced by a new, nonpartisan tribunal until
such time as the advantages of that type of organization are ac73
knowledged by all parties concerned."
Whatever the relative merits of the partisan and nonpartisan
systems, legislative bodies should clearly be free to make their
own choice.7 4 The Mlichigan Supreme Court has taken an unusual view. 75 A milk marketing board of five members was made
up of two milk producers, one distributor, one consumer, and the
commissioner of agriculture. The court held this system a denial
of due process, on the ground that the pecuniary interests of a
majority of the board prevented a fair hearing. The case is the
more extreme because the order fixed minimum prices to be paid
to all producers-clearly a legislative and in no sense a judicial
action. The court relied on the discredited decision of Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.,7 6 holding unconstitutional a delegation to coal

producers and miners of power to fix hours and wages. Closer to
the main current of present opinion is the holding in Miami
Laundry Co. v. Florida Dry Cleaning & L. Board, 77 approving a
board composed of three members from the cleaning industry, three
from the laundry industry, and one representing the public.
Somewhat more subtle than direct pecuniary interests are interests of other kinds that may be thought to come within the
ancient injunction that "no man shall be a judge in his own cause."
Just what is one's own cause is sometimes an elusive inquiry. In
Berkshire Employees Ass'n v. NLRB,78 it was held that the
Board must consider evidence which "bears the possibility of interpretation that he [a member of the Board] was endeavoring to
assist in a boycott on Berkshire's goods." The assumed major
premise seems to be that one who is unofficially taking action on
one side of a controversy is disqualified from adjudicating the
controversy. Significantly, the court pointed out that the interest
73. Id. at 185-86.
74. In Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, (1941) 312 U. S. 126
the Court approved an industry committee representing employers, employees.
and the public. Recommendations by an industry committee could be approved or disapproved by the Administrator, but not modified.
75. Johnson v. Michigan Milk Marketing Board, (1940) 295 Mich. 644,
295 N. W. 346, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 872, 89 U. of P. L. Rev. 977. The note
last cited says that of twenty existing milk control statutes, eight would be
invalidated if the rule of the Michigan case were applied.
76. (1936) 298 U. S. 238.
77. (1938) 134 Fla. 1, 13, 183 So. 759, 764. The basis for the holding
is: "All the act does is to prescribe certain qualifications for those appointed
to it."
78. (C.C.A. 3d 1941) 121 F. 2d 235, 90 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 487.
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charged "'goes far beyond a general predilection either for or
against labor organizations in general or one organization in
particular."' 3 Here we have an enunciation of the cardinal distinction: to have opinions--even feelings-about broad issues of
the sort that divide political parties does not disqualify; but to
align oneself with one side in a particular cause to be adjudicated
may disqualify.
What, then, is the effect of campaigning for the administrative
office, and making promises which are later fulfilled through administrative adjudication? In Montana Power Co. v. Public Service
Commission 0 one of the three commissioners did not participate,
so that the vote of Commissioner O'Connel was essential to support
the rate order. The company contended, vaguely, that O'Connell
."had already announced on several public occassions his opinion on
the issues thereafter submitted to him." The court rejected the
contention: "Irrespective of any opinion Commissioner O'Connell
may have expressed against the power company . . . during the
heat of a bitter political contest . . . the presumption is that, in

a case being considered, the commission, of which O'Connell was
one member, would act without bias or prejudice, and would be
guided in rendering a decision solely by the evidence submitted."'.
The court thus upheld the order without inquiring into the precise
nature of the campaign promises. Except to the extent that the
rule of necessity may justify this result, the decision may be of
questionable soundness, because the court apparently recognized
no distinction between statements of point of view and of general
policies, and statements about a particular company or a particular
2

rateY

The Rule of Necessity

In the Montana Power Company case the court bolstered its
opinion with the observation: "The Public Service Commission
is the only commission or body in the state that can act in
cases of this character." ' 3 Most of the decisions that judges or
79. Id. at 238-39. The court also said: "Decisions affecting human beings, made by human beings, necessarily are colored by the sum total of the
thoughts and emotions of those responsible for the decision."
80. (D. Mont. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 946.
81. Id. at 948.
82. In Southern Pac. Co. v. Board of R. R. Com'rs, (N.D. Cal. 1896)
78 F. 236, 260-61, the court summarily rejected a contention that one commissioner who joined in a rate order was "prejudiced" because of campaign
pledges. See also Georgia Continental Tel. Co. v. Georgia P. S. C., (N.D.
Ga. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 434.
83. Montana Power Co. v. Public Service Commission, (D. Mont.
1935) 12 F. Supp. 946, 949.
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administrators are not disqualified are in this manner reinforced
with reliance on the ideas that the tribunal would have to act
even if it were disqualified, for otherwise the organs of justice
would be unavailable. Many cases recognize a clear reason for
disqualification but nevertheless hold on the basis of the rule of
necessity that the tribunal should act. Most prominent is Evans
v. Gore,8 4 now superseded on the constitutional question of taxation,85 but still a reliable guide on the rule of necessity. The question was the validity of taxing income of federal judges, including
that of the Justices of the Supreme Court. The rule of necessity
was laid down: "Because of the individual relation of the members
of this court to the question, thus broadly stated, we cannot but
regret that its solution falls to us.... The plaintiff was entitled by
law to invoke our decision . . . and there was no other appellate.
tribunal to which under the law he could go.... In this situation,
the only course open to us is to consider and decide the cause,-a
conclusion supported by precedents reaching back many years."-",
This doctrine is similarly applied to state judges and to federal
and state administrators. Thus, a state court confronted with a case
concerning a tax on the compensation of judges held that "the rule
as to the disqualification of judges must yield if the right of appeal
is to be preserved. 8- 7 When the impartiality of the Federal Trade
Commission -was challenged, the court found no evidence to support the challenge and declared: "The Federal Trade Commission
Act establishes the composition of the Commission and contains no
provision for change of venue. The 'stern rule of necessity' required the Commission to act." 88 In another case a party sought
to escape the rule of necessity by arguing that the Department of
Justice and the courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the Trade
Commission to enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts, but the
court rejected the contention by observing that the Commission
is the only tribunal clothed with the power to protect the public
against unfair methods of competition and price discrimination and
that therefore the rule of necessity required the Commission to
hear the case."8 The same rule applies to state agencies, 0 although
84.

(1920) 253 U. S. 245.

85. O'Malley v. Woodrough, (1939) 307 U. S. 277 refuses to follow
Evans v. Gore on the tax question.
86. 253 U. S. at 247-48. Accord: State v. Sage Stores, (1943) 157 Kan.
622, 143 P. 2d 652, aff'd on other grounds, (1944) 323 U. S. 32.
-87. Gordy v. Dennis, (1939) 176 Md. 106, 5 A. 2d 69.
88. Loughran v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 8th 1944) 143 F.
2d 431, 433.

89. Marquette Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 7th
1945) 147 F. 2d 589.
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one exceptional decision has ignored it"1 and another has seemingly
rejected it."-'
Procedures of Asserting Disqualification-TheAdministrative
ProcedureAct
Under a federal statute applicable to district judges, the mere
filing of a sufficient affidavit will compel the trial judge to disqualify himself, and the judge may not pass upon the truth or
falsity of the charges made in the affidavit.9 3 In the Supreme Court
the uniform practice has been to leave questions of disqualification to individual Justices, the Court itself never passing on
such questions.' Before the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, the method for disqualifying an administrative adjudicator was not clear, except for the general assumption that
questions of disqualification could be raised on judicial review.
The Communications Commission held in a prominent case that
90. Brinkley v. Hassig, (C.C.A. 10th 1936) 83 F. 2d 351; Ison v.
Western Vegetable Distributors, (1936) 48 Ariz. 104, 59 P. 2d 649; Zober
v. Turner, (1930) 106 N. J. L. 86, 148 A. 894. In State ex inf. Barrett, ex rel.
Bradshaw v. Hedrick, (1922) 294 Mo. 21, 241 S. W. 402, the court relied
on the rule of necessity even to the extent of refusing to discuss the question
of bias.
In Molloy v. Collins, (1941) 66 R. I. 251, 18 A. 2d 639, the legislature
authorized the mayor to remove an officer, if found guilty upon hearing
before the mayor. The statute was passed after the mayor had repeatedly
made charges against the officer. The court held the bias of the mayor was
immaterial because the legislature knew of the bias when it empowered
the mayor to act. The court said this result is based on the statute and
not the rule of necessity.
In Caminetti v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., (1943) 22 Cal. (2d) 344,
139 P. 2d 909, the rule of necessity was applied to an insurance commissioner
to permit him to make contracts relating to a company in which he owned
policies.
91. Abrams v. Jones, (1922) 35 Ida. 352, 207 P. 724. Inasmuch as the
court first held that the commissioner had exceeded his statutory powers,
and next held that failure to provide a bill of particulars nullified the administrative proceeding, the treatment of the bias question might be regarded by some as dictum.
92. State ex rel. Miller v. Aldridge, (1925) 212 Ala. 660, 103 So. 835,
39 A. L. R. 1470. The annotation, 39 A. L. R. 1476, contains a good collection of cases on the application of the rule of necessity to both judicial and
administrative officers.
93. Berger v. United States, (1921) 255 U. S. 22. The statute does not
apply to judges of circuit courts of appeals. Millslagle v. Olson, (C.C.A. 8th
1942) 128 F. 2d 1015.
94. Even Mr. Justice Jackson, protesting against a failure of Mr. Justice
Black to disqualify himself, granted this: "No statute prescribes grounds
upon which a Justice of this Court may be disqualified in any case. The Court
itself has never undertaken by rule of Court or decision to formulate any
uniform practice on the subject. Because of this lack of authoritative standards
it appears always to have been considered the responsibility of each Justice
to determine for himself the propriety of withdrawing in any particular
circumstances." Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local, (1945) 325 U. S. 897.
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the Commission could prevent one commissioner from participating,
over the objection of that commissioner.95' And a Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an agency must hear evidence designed to disqualify a member of the National Labor Relations Board 8 The
Administrative Procedure Act provides: "The functions of all presiding officers and of officers participating in decisions in conformity with section 8 shall be conducted in an impartial manner.
Any such officer may at any time withdraw if he deems himself
disqualified; and, upon the filing in good faith of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of any such officer, the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record
and decision in the case." 97 Unlike district judges, examiners and
other officers participating in decisions are not forced to withdraw
upon the mere filing of a sufficient affidavit; the truth of the charges
must be established to force a disqualification of an administrative
officer. The term "personal bias" is the same as the term used in
the federal statute on disqualification of judges and is likely to be
interpreted the same way-an "impersonal prejudice'" is not
enough. 9 8 The committee reports make clear that a presiding officer may still be active in assuring that all necessary evidence is
adduced, that in an appropriate case a protest may be dismissed
as insufficient on its face, and that the agency may itself hear argument or evidence on the protest or may designate an examiner to
do so. 99 Nothing in the legislative history tends to indicate that the
Act in any way changes the substantive law concerning grounds
for disqualification.
95. In the Matter of Segal and Smith, (1937) 5 F. C. C. 3, 51 Harv.
L. Rev. 1101.
96. Berkshire Employees' Ass'n v. NLRB, (C.C.A. 3d 1941) 121 F. 2d
235."*
97. Sec. 7(a), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U. S. C. A. 1006(a) (Supp. 1946).
98. Price v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th 1942) 125 F. 2d 806, cert. den., (1924)
316 U. S. 677.
99. Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 207, 269 (1946),

